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LABOR UNIONS-VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR TORTS COMMITTED BY
MEMBERS-Buchanan v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
94 Wn. 2d 508, 617 P.2d 1004 (1980).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Washington Supreme Court reconsidered the standard for assess-
ing the civil liability of a labor union, its officers, and its members for
torts committed by individual union members in Buchanan v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters. ' Buchanan, a nonunion truck driver,
alleged that he was severely beaten by members of the defendant unions
for driving his delivery truck across their picket lines during a strike. Bu-
chanan specifically named five union members, their local and interna-
tional unions, and the international union trustee 2 as defendants.
The trial court dismissed the unions' motion for summary judgment.
The Washington Supreme Court granted review to address the issue of the
proper standard of proof for judging union liability in tort actions. Five
justices3 agreed that RCW § 49.32.070, 4 which limits officer, member,
and organizational liability, did not apply in such cases. In so holding, the
court reaffirmed its seventeen-year-old decision in Titus v. Tacoma Smel-
termen's Union5 that general rules of agency law alone determine whether
a union, its officers, or its members may be held responsible for the
wrongful acts of individual members. 6
1. 94Wn.2d508,617P.2d 1004(1980).
2. At the time of this incident, Independent Local 313 was in trusteeship of the International
Union. Id. at 508, 617 P.2d at 1004.
3. Justice Brachtenbach wrote the court's opinion.
4. Section 6 of the Labor Disputes Act (1933) states:
No officer or member of any association or organization and no association or organization
participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of
the state of Washington for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except
upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification-
of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.
Ch. 7, § 6, 1933 Wash. Laws (Ex. Sess.) 10 (1933) (codified at WASH. REv. CODE § 49.32.070
(1979)).
5. 62Wn. 2d461,383P.2d504(1963).
6. Both the Titus and Buchanan decisions analyze union liability for individual members' acts
under the common-law principles applicable to a master-servant relationship. In Titus, for example,
the court followed the rule "that a master may be held liable for the tortious acts of his servant,
although he may not know or approve of them, if such acts arefdone within the scope of employ-
ment." Id. at 469, 383 P.2d at 509-10 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958)).
Thus, under the rationale of respondeat superior, masters do not incur liability due to their own mis-
conduct; rather, it is the fact that the masters' servants have committed wrongful acts while in their
service which holds the masters responsible. W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY, 141
(1973). In the labor relations setting, the union is considered as the master and the errant union
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In following Titus, the court remained unpersuaded by the United
States Supreme Court's decision in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs. 7 In
Gibbs, decided three years after Titus, the High Court determined that
section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 8-progenitor of RCW § 49.32.-
070 9-was the proper standard of proof for a claim brought against a
union under state tort law. 10
The effect of the Buchanan holding is to leave Washington with a dif-
ferent standard for proving a union's vicarious tort liability than exists
under federal law. When the responsibility of a union, its officers, and its
members I is adjudged in accordance with Washington law, common-law
rules on agency are applied; when the identical liability is at issue under
federal law, section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies.
This note first considers major developments in the law which preceded
Buchanan. The reasoning of the Washington Supreme Court in this case
then will be explicated, together with an analysis of the disparate views of
the members of the court. This analysis will show that the majority posi-
tion has unnecessarily excluded tort actions from the purview of RCW §
49.32.070. The note will conclude with a proposal for an alternative ap-
proach for the Washington courts to follow in future union-related tort
cases.
II. BACKGROUND
The basic notion that a union may be held liable for torts committed by
members fill the servant role. Unfortunately, the Washington court has not addressed the issue
whether the common-law master-servant paradigm is still the most appropriate one by which to ana-
lyze the modem union-member relationship. See also 39 WASLt. L. REv. 217 (1964).
7. 383 U.S. 715 (1966.
8. No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization
participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of
the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents. except upon
clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of. such acts, or of ratification of
such acts after actual knowledge thereof.
Ch. 90, § 6. 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1976)).
9. RCW § 49.32.070 is part of Washington's so-called "little Norris-LaGuardia Act." It was
passed by the Washington legislature one year after the United States Congress enacted the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. Labor Disputes Act. ch. 7. 1933 Wash. Laws (Ex. Sess.) 10 (1933). The Washington
law mirrors its federal counterpart. See note 4 supra.
10. Justice Horowitz. dissenting in Buchanan, found the "majority's reliance on Titus" to be
"clearly misplaced after Gibbs," and would have had Washington follow the federal rule. 94 Wn. 2d
at 515, 617 P.2d at 1007. Chief Justice Utter and Justice Dolliver joined in Justice Horowitz's opin-
ion.
II. This note is concerned exclusively with the question of union liablity in cases in which some-
one has acted on behalf of a union. The issue of personal liability of a union member who has acted
only in an individual capacity will not be discussed.
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its members and officers.is well-established. 12 Various courts have de-
cided, for example, that labor organizations were responsible for negli-
gently maintaining property, 13 wrongfully depriving members of the right
to work, 14 interfering with an employer's operation, 15 interfering with a
contract, 16 and willfully destroying the property of a nonstriking em-
ployee. 17
Notwithstanding the existence of such liability, the question of its ex-
tent has been a difficult one to resolve. Historically, courts and legisla-
tures throughout the United States have not been consistent in their toler-
ance of union-related activities. 18 Early in the nineteenth century, the
doctrine of criminal conspiracy was invoked to chill organized efforts
aimed at improving working conditions. 19 By 1842 this doctrine had
fallen into disfavor, as courts recognized that not all combinations of
workers were malevolent. 20 But later in the nineteenth century, union ac-
tivity again was discouraged, as courts used the doctrine of civil conspir-
acy to enjoin strikes and picketing. 21 Their underlying theory was that
12. The United States Supreme Court specifically has recognized that tort actions may be brought
against unions in state courts and are not preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. Farmer v.
Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977). See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 130, at
962-69 (4th ed. 1971); Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 405 (1975).
13. Marshall v. ILWU Local 6, 57 Cal. 2d 781, 371 P.2d 987, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1962) (en
banc) (parking lot next to union hall improperly obstructed).
14. United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 160 Tex. 203, 328 S.W.2d 739 (1959).
15. United Mine Workers of America v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
824 (1954) (union held responsible for field representative's actions).
16. Love & Amos Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 53 Tenn. App. 37, 378 S.W.2d 430
(1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964).
17. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Newman, 116 Ga. App. 590, 158 S.E.2d 298
(1967).
18. For detailed historical developments of this area see N. CHAMBERLAIN & D. CULLEN, THE
LABOR SECTOR 91-156 (2d ed. 1971); A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LABOR LAW 7-102 (8th ed. 1979); R. SMrrH, L. MERRIFIELD & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS
LAW 2-68 (6th ed. 1979).
19. Commonwealth v. Pullis (The Philadelphia Cordwainers' Case) (Philadelphia Mayor's Court
1806), reprinted in 3 J. COMMONS & E. GILMORE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETY 59 (1910); R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD & T. ST. ANTOINE, supra note 18, at 3-6.
20. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 38 Am. Dec. 346 (1842). See
also N. CHAMBERLAIN & D. CULLEN, supra note 18, at 126.
21. R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD & T. ST. ANTOINE, supra note 18, at 11-12. In one typical case,
the issue was whether a picket in front of plaintiff's factory should be enjoined. The court wrote:
An employer has a right to engage all persons who are willing to work for him, at such prices as
may be mutually agreed upon, and persons employed or seeking employment have a corre-
sponding right to enter into or remain in the employment of any person or corporation willing to
employ them. These rights are secured by the constitution itself. . . . No one can lawfully
interfere by force or intimidation to prevent employers or persons employed or wishing to be
employed from the exercise of these rights. . . . Intimidation is not limited to threats of vio-
lence or of physical injury to person or property. It has a broader signification, and there also
may be a moral intimidation which is illegal. . . . The patrol was unlawful interference both
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unions through these activities perpetrated actionable harms upon em-
ployers and society. 22 Federal statutory schemes also affected judicial de-
cisions on union organizational efforts. For instance, courts severely cur-
tailed boycotts and strikes under the Sherman Antitrust Act23 by
construing such activities as illegal attempts to obtain a labor market mo-
nopoly.24
In response to these developments, Congress and many state legisla-
tures perceived a need to remove labor unions from the constraints im-
posed by judicial interpretations of the common law and antitrust laws.
The first congressional attempt to accomplish this goal, the Clayton Act 25
(1914), proved ineffective, although it did signal the beginning of a more
lenient governmental attitude toward unions. 26 Then in 1932, after many
unsuccessful attempts at further reforming the country's labor laws,
27
with the plaintiff and with the workmen, within the principle of many cases; and, when insti-
tuted for the purpose of interfering with his business, it became a private nuisance.
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077, 1077 (1896)(citations omitted). It should be
noted that Justice Holmes's dissent in this case proved to be a harbinger of 20th-century views toward
labor organization:
But there is a notion, which latterly has been insisted on a good deal, that a combination of
persons to do what any of them lawfully might do by himself will make the otherwise lawful
conduct unlawful. It would be rash to say that some as yet unformulated truth may not be hidden
under this proposition. But, in the general form in which it has been presented and accepted by
many courts, I think it plainly untrue, both on authority and principle. . . . It is plain from the
slightest consideration of practical affairs, or the most superficial reading of industrial history.
that free competition means combination, and that the organization of the world, now going on
so fast, means an ever-increasing might and scope of combination. It seems to me futile to set
our faces against this tendency. Whether beneficial on the whole, as I think it, or detrimental, it
is inevitable, unless the fundamental axioms of society, and even the fundamental conditions of
life, are to be changed.
Id., 44 N.E. at 108 1.
22. N. CHAMBERLAIN & D. CULLEN, supra note 18, at 127-28.
23. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)). Although contro-
versy surrounded the initial intent of the Sherman Act, there is little doubt as to its anti-union effect.
The Danbury Hatter's Case (Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), and Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S.
522 (1915)) is illustrative. There, an organization of hatters was held liable under the Sherman Act
for instituting a boycott against a manufacturer. In the subsequent case of Coronado Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers (Coronado II), 268 U.S. 295 (1925), the Supreme Court reversed a directed
verdict in favor of the union and held that it could be liable under the Sherman Act for strikes and
picketing directed against a coal company. See N. CHAMBERLAIN & D. CULLEN. supra note 18. at
128-29.
24. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 130, at 964.
25. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976)).
26. The country's labor laws were further liberalized in 1926 under the Railway Labor Act. ch.
347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976)).
27. See Commentary to STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: LABOR ORGANIZATION, at
162 (R. Koretz ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as LABOR ORGANIZATION].
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Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act.28 A number of states fol-
lowed suit with statutory regulation of labor injunctions and "yellow-
dog" contracts. 29 Washington, in 1933, joined those states by adopting a
"little" Norris-LaGuardia Act.30 Both the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the
Washington Labor Disputes Act recognized that "the individual unorga-
nized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract
and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable
terms and conditions of employment .... ,,31 These Acts, therefore,
sought to insure that each employee
have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of rep-
resentatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of
his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or
coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such
representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... 32
Toward the optimal achievement of these goals, a special provision
was included in the Norris-LaGuardia and Washington Acts to alleviate
some of the pressure facing unions and their leaders involved or interested
in a labor dispute. Section 6 of the federal and Washington statutes re-
quire that organizational, officer, and member liability for "unlawful acts
of individual officers, members, or agents" rest "upon clear proof of ac-
tual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratifica-
tion of such acts after actual knowledge thereof. ", 33 Applying this stan-
dard, in light of the enunciated purpose of the original and "little"
Norris-LaGuardia Acts, has been an ongoing task for the courts.
The first major consideration of section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
28. Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 10 1- 115 (1976)). See generally
LABOR ORGANIZATION, supra note 27, at 162-257 (outstanding development of the passage of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act).
29. Aaron, Labor Injunctions in the State Courts-Part 1: A Survey, 50 VA. L. REV. 951,
953-56 (1964).
30. Labor Disputes Act, ch. 7, 1933 Wash. Laws (Ex. Sess.) 10 (1933) (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE ch. 49.32 (1979)). Fourteen years earlier, the legislature had sanctioned the existence of labor
unions. In so doing, it created the basis for future labor relations in Washington:
LEGALIZING LABOR UNIONS
AN ACT declaring labor unions to be lawful organizations; relating to the powers of the courts
of this state in the granting of injunctions; declaring the labor of a human being not a commodity
or article of commerce; prohibiting the indictment, prosecution or trial of any person or combi-
nation of persons for any lawful act in furtherance of bettering of his or their conditions.
Act of March 12, 1919, ch. 185, 1919 Wash. Laws (Ex. Sess.) 568 (1919) (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE ch. 49.36 (1979)).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1976); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.32.020 (1979).
32. Id.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1976); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.32.070 (1979). See notes 4 and 8 supra for
complete text.
Washington Law Review Vol. 57:193, 1981
occurred in the landmark case of United Brotherhood of Carpenters v.
United States.34 There, defendant unions were charged under the Sher-
man Antitrust Act with criminally conspiring to fix wages. At issue was
whether section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act shielded the unions and
their members from responsibility for wrongful acts committed by union
leaders in "individual" capacities, when these unions and members had
never officially participated in, expressly authorized, or ratified the acts.
The Court held that there was no union or membership liability "without
clear proof that the organization or member charged with responsibility
for the offense actually participated, gave prior authorization, or ratified
such acts after actual knowledge of their perpetration. -35
The state courts did not unanimously adopt the Supreme Court's
United Brotherhood holding when considering their own "little" Norris-
LaGuardia acts. While the Supreme Court of Connecticut deferred to the
United Brotherhood construction of section 6 when applying a similar
state provision, 36 the Indiana Supreme Court declined to do likewise. In
Nelson v. Haley,37 the Indiana court narrowly interpreted the title of its
34. 330 U.S. 395 (1947).
35. Id. at 403. See LABOR ORGANIZATION, supra note 27, at 185-87. 200, 205. 235. See also 3
H. TOULMIN, A TREATISE ON THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 23.2, 23.3, 23.16
(1949 & Supp. 1980). In reviewing the legislative history of § 6, Justice Reed, writing for the major-
ity in United Brotherhood, took notice of the congressional debate over the effect of this standard. He
concluded that there was no need to label it as either a rule of evidence or a substantive change in the
law of agency. 330 U.S. at 403.
Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, strongly objected to the construction given to § 6 by the majority:
"The construction given by the court to § 6 is based on considerations which move in a world of
unreality." Id. at 414. Frankfurter claimed that the Court's interpretation allowed unions to escape
their responsibilities too easily, id. at 415, and practically speaking, it provided unions with immu-
nity for acts performed by their agents. Id. at 417, 421. In sum, Frankfurter maintained that Congress
simply intended § 6 to limit the overextension of the doctrine of conspiracy, via the use of agency
principles:
The Congressional purpose behind § 6, then, is clear. All that Congress sought to do was to
eliminate an extraneous doctrine that had crept into some of the decisions whereby organizations
were held responsible not for acts of agents who had authority to act, but for every act commit-
ted by any member of the union merely because he was a member, or because he had some
relation to the union although not authorized by virtue of his position to act for the union in what
he did. And so Congress charged the federal courts with the duty to look sharply to the relation
of the individual to the affairs of the organization, and not to confound individual with union
unless the individual is clothed with power by the union, in the ordinary way of union operation.
in doing what he does for the union.
Id. at 418-20 (footnotes omitted). It is instructive that the Senate Committee on the Judiciary had
looked to the earlier work by Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930), in its considera-
tion of injunction abuses. S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., I st Sess.. Part 1 (1932).
36. Benoit v. Amalgamated Local 299 United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of Amer-
ica, 150 Conn. 266, 188 A.2d 499. 502-03 (1963) (union members prevented nonunion employees
from entering a plant).
37. 232Ind. 314. 111 N.E.2d812(1953).
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state act and thereby refused to limit a union's liability in a civil action for
assault and battery by a union organizer. 38
Washington was among the states that refused to follow United Broth-
erhood. In Titus v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Union39 the Washington Su-
preme Court unanimously determined that United Brotherhood was not
controlling in a civil action for unlawful interference with an employment
contract. 40 The court held that RCW § 49.32.070 (Washington's counter-
part to section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act) applied only to cases in-
volving restraining orders and injunctions; it did not extend to the area of
tort liability. 41 The court based its ruling on the fact that this statute is part
of the state Labor Disputes Act, which professes to deal only with enjoin-
ing conduct involved in a labor dispute. 42 United Brotherhood was distin-
guished as being limited solely to whether section 6 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act applies to criminal liability under the Sherman Act.43
Any doubt whether the United States Supreme Court considered United
Brotherhood controlling in tort cases involving unions should have been
erased in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.44 The plaintiff in Gibbs sued the
38. The title of the 1933 Indiana Act varies somewhat from that of RCW § 49.32.0 11, but the
Indiana Act limits the powers of its state courts in a similar manner:
An act defining and limiting the jurisdiction of the courts of this state in the issuance of restrain-
ing orders and injunctions in cases involving or growing out of labor disputes and declaring the
public policy of the state in relation thereto, providing that certain promises, agreements and
contracts shall afford no basis for the granting of legal or equitable relief by the courts of this
state ...
Injunctions [in Labor Disputes] Act, ch. 12, 1933 Ind. Acts (1933), quoted in Nelson v. Haley, 232
Ind. 314, 111 N.E.2d 812, 814 (1953). The Supreme Court of Indiana never reached the United
Brotherhood decision. Rather, it held that the provision (§ 6) of the Act limiting union liability for
members' actions was void as being outside of the scope of the Act's title. The court was then left to
strictly determine the defendant union's liability under standard agency analysis. Ill N.E.2d at 815.
39. 62Wn. 2d461,383 P.2d 504 (1963).
40. Id. at 468, 383 P.2d at 509. Specifically, nonunion employees sought recovery of damages
from the union after two of its members denied the plaintiffs entry to the workplace and assaulted
them. See generally 39 WASH. L. REv. 217 (1964).
41. 62 Wn. 2d at 468,383 P.2d at 509.
42. As the court noted:
[T]he title of the act, from which RCW Chapter 49.32 was codified, reads as follows:
"An Act relating to labor, and labor disputes, defining and limiting the powers of the courts
of this state in the granting of restraining orders and injunctions in cases involving or growing
out of any labor dispute, and in the trial and punishment for contempt for violation thereof,
declaring the public policy of the State of Washington with respect thereto and with respect to
contracts of employment and hiring, and repealing all acts and parts of acts in conflict there-
with." (Italics ours.)
Id. at 468, 383 P.2d at 509 (quoting Labor Disputes Act, ch. 7, Title sentence, 1933 Wash. Laws
(Ex. Sess.) 10 (1933) (Title sentence not codified in WASH. REV. CODE)).
43. Id. at 468-69,383 P.2d at 509.
44. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). Gibbs most often has been discussed for its procedural significance in
establishing the power of federal courts to retain jurisdiction over state-law claims under the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 220-24
199
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United Mine Workers union for interference with his contracts of employ-
ment and haulage. The defendant union successfully argued that section 6
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act limited its liability. In writing for the Court,
Justice Brennan was convinced that, in the wake of the 1947 Labor Man-
agement Relations Act (LMRA), Congress intended section 6 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act to continue to apply to those claims not covered by
the LMRA. 45
Federal courts consistently have relied upon Gibbs to determine union
liability for wrongful individual acts. 46 Any questions related to the appli-
cation of section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to tort law have centered
around the interpretation, not the appropriateness, of the federal legisla-
tion. 47 As evidenced by Buchanan v. International Brotherhood of Team-
(1966). Substantively, however, this case involved claims brought in federal court under § 303 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976), and under the Tennessee common law of
torts.
45. 383 U.S. at 736. Following World War II, there was growing dissatisfaction with the origi-
nal dictates of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. H8 151-167 (1976)) (also known as the Wagner Act), as strikes proliferated and
union power increased. In 1947, Congress enacted the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).
ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. 98 141-187 (1976)) (also known as the
Taft-Hartley Act) in order to further control the manner in which labor relations would occur, and
thus encourage greater industrial peace. New provisions were added to the NLRA which allowed
suits to be brought in federal court to enforce collective bargaining agreements. Also. actions for
damages could be filed in both state and federal courts for various unfair labor practices. See gener-
ally B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW 32-34 (2d ed. 1977).
It remained for the courts to decide how the LMRA should be applied in those instances where
sections of it conflicted with portions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In Gibbs, the question was raised
whether § 301 of the LMRA, which provides that unions be held liable under agency standards.
superceded § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Justice Brennan's conclusion was that Congress. well
aware of the United Brotherhood decision, intended that § 6 remain the applicable test in those situa-
tions not specifically within LMRA coverage. Justice Brennan wrote: "The driving force behind §
6 . . . was the fear that unions might be destroyed if they could be held liable for damage done by
acts beyond their practical control. Plainly. § 6 applies to federal court adjudications of state tort
claims arising out of labor disputes ...... 383 U.S. at 736-37 (footnotes omitted). See also Com-
plete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981). Furthermore, Justice Brennan attempted to
clarify the "'clear proof" standard of § 6. He maintained that while the plaintiff need not satisfy the
criminal burden of "beyond a reasonable doubt," the plaintiff must do more than meet the ordinary
civil burden of persuasion. According to Justice Brennan, a plaintiff "must come forward with more
than a bare preponderance of the evidence to prevail. " 383 U.S. at 737.
In a separate concurring opinion, Justices Harlan and Clark took exception to the Court's construc-
tion of § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Justice Harlan wrote that "[the Court construes this provi-
sion as fixing a new test of the quantum of proof, somewhere between ordinary civil and criminal
standards." Id. at 743. He thought that such a reading of § 6 would, accordingly. create ambiguity as
to the proper standard in criminal cases. Id.
46. E.g., Kayser-Roth Corp. v. Textile Workers Union, 479 F.2d 524. 528 (6th Cir. 1973). cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Riverside Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 410 F.2d 267, 271-72
(6th Cir. 1969).
47. For example, in Smith v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 368 F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1966).
200
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sters, however, not all states with "little" Norris-LaGuardia Acts have
been compelled to follow the Supreme Court's lead in Gibbs in tort
cases.
48
II. THE BUCHANAN COURT'S REASONING
In Buchanan, the court was squarely presented with the question
whether it should continue to follow its construction of RCW § 49.32.070
given in Titus v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Union, in view of the variant ap-
plication of the identical federal statute by the United States Supreme
Court in Gibbs. Justice Brachtenbach, writing for the court, answered this
question affirmatively, holding that general rules of agency law should
remain the sole determinants of a union's vicarious tort liability. 49 He
gave two reasons for this decision. First, Justice Brachtenbach agreed
that, in light of the title description- of the Labor Disputes Act, the court
was correct in Titus to limit the applicability of RCW § 49.32.070 to
cases involving restraining orders, injunctions, and contempt matters. 50
Justice Brachtenbach raised, but never directly addressed, petitioners'
contention that the Titus court originally was wrong in examining the title
of RCW § 49.32 to interpret the legislature's intent.51 Second, Justice
the court referred to Gibbs and could only conclude that "[s]ection six is either a rule of evidence or
one changing the substantive law of agency." Id. at 514.
The Supreme Court has attempted to provide further guidance as to the meaning of § 6. In Ramsey
v. United Mine Workers, 401 U.S. 302 (1971), Justice White explained that:
On its face § 6 is not addressed to the quantum of evidence required to prove the occurrence of
the alleged "unlawful acts." It is concerned only with requiring "clear proof" that the person or
organization charged actually participated in, authorized, or ratified "such acts." Nothing in the
words of the section suggests that a new and different standard of proof was being prescribed for
all issues in actions against a union, its members or its officers involved in a labor disptite. The
section neither expressly nor by implication requires satisfaction of the clear-proof standard in
deciding factual issues concerning the commission vel non of acts by union officers or by mem-
bers alleged to constitute a conspiracy ....
Id. at 309. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black, Harlan and Marshall, sharply disagreed. In
Justice Douglas's opinion, § 6 requires "clear proof" that a union had authorized, participated in, or
ratified the "unlawful acts" in question. According to Justice Douglas, § 6 liability for a union meant
that it "had full complicity in the scheme." Id. at 315 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
48. Interestingly, in 1972 the Connecticut Supreme Court had an opportunity to reevaluate its
state counterpart to § 6 in light of Gibbs. Contrary to the Washington Supreme Court, it found the
United States Supreme Court's application to be persuasive. United Aircraft Corp. v. International
Ass'n of Machinists, 161 Conn. 79, 285 A.2d 330, 336-37 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016
(1972).
49. 94 Vn. 2d at 509-10,617 P.2d at 1004-05.
50. Id.
51. Id. Petitioners apparently argued that the language of the union-liability statute was not am-
biguous and, accordingly, the Washington Supreme Court never should have resorted to the Act's
title for further meaning. See generally Ayers v. City of Tacoma, 6 Wn. 2d 545, 556-57, 108 P.2d
348, 353 (1940) (where act is ambiguous, legislative history, including the act's title, may be re-
sorted to in determining legislative intent).
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Brachtenbach cited the seventeen-year legislative silence following Titus
as being determinative. He presumed that the state legislature knew of
that decision, and chose to agree with the result reached therein. 52
Justice Rosellini's concurring opinion rested upon brief reexaminations
of two United States Supreme Court decisions. From United Brother-
hood, he reasoned that section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was "en-
acted to forestall judicial discouragement of legitimate union activity
through application of rules of conspiracy liability." 53 According to Jus-
tice Rosellini, then, the Washington court in Titus was entirely justified in
concluding that the federal provision was meant to be limited to criminal
prosecutions, as opposed to civil damage suits. He also distinguished the
complaint in Gibbs (an economic harm) from that in Buchanan (a physi-
cal harm). Thus, Justice Rosellini argued, in neither United Brotherhood
nor in Gibbs "was the [United States Supreme] court called upon to de-
cide whether the section [6] was meant to restrict recovery in cases of
physical assault." 54 He also agreed with Justice Brachtenbach's reading
of the state legislature's post-Titus silence, interpreting it as an acquies-
cence with the court's earlier decision. 55
Justice Horowitz, in dissent, felt that the court's reliance on Titus was
clearly misplaced after Gibbs. He maintained that the United States Su-
preme Court had properly extended United Brotherhood into tort law and
that the Washington court should have appreciated the precedential value
of that interpretation, instead of reexamining it.56 Claiming that the Titus
court improperly read United Brotherhood as limiting section 6 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act to criminal actions only, Justice Horowitz further-
more found that the court in Titus erred in its reliance on the title of the
Washington Labor Disputes Act as a limitation on the scope of RCW §
49.32.070. 57 Finally, he disputed the majority's interpretation of the
meaning of the state legislature's inactivity following Titus. 58
52. 94 Wn. 2d at 511,617 P.2d at 1005-06.
53. Id. at 513. 617 P.2d at 1006.
54. Id.. 617 P.2dat 1007.
55. Id.
56. Id. at516.617P.2dat 1008.
57. Id. at517.617P.2dat 1008-09.
58. There is no evidence in this case that this court's interpretation of RCW 49.32.070 in Titus
was ever expressly considered by the legislature. Rather than presuming acquiescence in an
erroneous interpretation because of the legislature's silence. it would be as logical to conclude
that no action was taken because the legislators presumed that the Supreme Court's decision 3
years later in Gibbs insured that RCW 49.32.070 would be properly interpreted to preclude tort
suits of the type brought in this case without clear proof of participation. authorization or ratifi-
cation.
Id.
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IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE BUCHANAN COURT'S
REASONING
A. The Standard of Proof
The Buchanan decision highlights the contrast between the federal and
Washington approaches to a union's vicarious tort liability. The United
States Supreme Court had determined that a union, its officers, and its
members should be held responsible for individual wrongful acts only
when there is "clear, unequivocal, and convincing proof" that they actu-
ally participate in, authorize, or ratify such conduct. The Washington Su-
preme Court refused to adopt this strict standard. Instead, it chose to con-
tinue judging vicarious responsibility for torts under common-law rules of
agency. Thus, in Washington, the salient test for union liability remains
whether union members, although acting individually, are within the
scope of their "employment" relationship with the union and in further-
ance of the union's "business" when they commit torts.
The primary distinction between these standards is the extentto which
union involvement with a wrongful act must be demonstrated in order to
attribute liability to it. Following Buchanan, it remains quite possible for
a union in the state of Washington to be held responsible for unknown and
unapproved behavior of members who intend to act on their union's be-
half. Contrarily, the more difficult burden of proof found in the federal
test makes it less likely that a union will incur liability when its members,
attempting to help their union, independently commit acts of violence. 59
B. Tort Actions Under RCW § 49.32.070
Justice Brachtenbach was persuaded by the Titus court's finding that
the state legislature intended RCW § 49.32.070 to apply only "to re-
straining orders, injunctions, and contempt matters arising out of labor
disputes,"6 and not to tort liability. This interpretation exclusively con-
siders the means employed by the original 1933 Labor Disputes Act and
improperly overlooks the full purpose of the legislation.
59. As noted earlier, Justice Frankfurter in his United Brotherhood dissent recognized the full
potential for union protection under § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See note 35 supra. In that case,
the Supreme Court was considering the relationship between the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Sher-
man Act, and Justice Frankfurter wrote:
To come under the Court's indulgent rule of immunity from liability for the acts of its officers,
unions will not rest on a lack of affirmative authorization. To make assurance doubly sure they
will, doubtless in good conscience, have standing orders disavowing authority on the part of
their officers to make any agreements which may be found to be in violation of the Sherman
Law.
330 U.S. at 421.
60. 94XWn. 2dat511,617P.2dat t005.
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Restraining orders and injunctions undermined organizational activity
early in this century, and it is undisputed that the Norris-LaGuardia and
Labor Disputes Acts were aimed at curtailing their use. Nevertheless, it
also must be concluded that these statutes were enacted more generally as
vehicles to facilitate the open operation of the labor marketplace. As re-
flected by the second sections of the Norris-LaGuardia and Labor Dis-
putes Acts, 61 the legislative policy underlying them was to guarantee cer-
tain freedoms for employees. These included the right to associate with
coworkers, to self-organize, to designate representatives, and to negotiate
terms and conditions of employment. They also included the right to be
free from the interference, restraint or coercion of employers in such de-
signation, organization, or other concerted activities of collective bar-
gaining and mutual protection. 62
A primary object of the Norris-LaGuardia and Labor Disputes Acts,
therefore, was that the courts not be used in a manner which would ob-
struct these goals. 63 The Senate Judiciary Committee, in considering pas-
sage of section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, expressed a distinct con-
cern that legitimate labor activity remain unencumbered by threats of
damage awards against law-abiding union leaders and members. It found,
for example:
In case of a strike, where the officers of the labor union are doing every-
thing within their power to prevent acts of violence from being committed
by any person, the law should fully protect them and save them and the
members of their organization who are following their advice from liability
61. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1976): WASH. REV. CODE § 49.32.020 (1979).
62. See text accompanying notes 31 & 32 supra.
63. For example, section 4 of the Labor Disputes Act denies Washington state courts jurisdic-
tion to issue restraining orders or injunctions in cases arising out of labor disputes, when such issu-
ance would prohibit participants from:
(1) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment:
(2) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization . . . ;
(3) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or interested in such
labor dispute any strike or unemployment benefits or insurance or other moneys or things of
value:
(4) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any labor dispute who
is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action or suit in any court of the United
States or of any state;
(5) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether
by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or violence;
(6) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests in a labor
dispute;
(7) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the acts heretofore specified:
(8) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts heretofore specified: and
(9) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence the acts
heretofore specified. ...
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.32.050 (1979). See also Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
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in damages because of unlawful acts of persons who are either directly or
indirectly cohnected with those who are trying to defeat the purposes of the
strike. 64
Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court in Gibbs was persuaded
that Congress intended unions to be protected from vicarious liability for
unauthorized torts committed by their members. 65
The expansive scope of both the Washington and federal Acts further
supports the Gibbs approach to protection for unions. Both Acts apply to
cases "involving or growing out of a labor dispute." ' 66 RCW § 49.32.-
110, borrowing from section 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, defines
"labor dispute" quite broadly as "any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representa-
tion of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking
to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or
not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and em-
ployee. "67 Since tortious conduct may easily occur in such a "labor dis-
pute" there is little logic in protecting a union from injunctions but deny-
ing such protection from damage actions.
This conclusion also rebuts the argument in Justice Rosellini's concur-
rence that the Washington court was not bound by either United Brother-
hood or Gibbs because those cases involved economic harms while Bu-
64. S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1 (1933).
65. "The driving force behind § 6 . .. was the fear that unions might be destroyed if they
could be held liable for damage done by acts beyond their practical control." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at
736-37 (footnotes omitted). While the Court has conceded that the Norris-LaGuardia Act addressed
a different labor-management situation than that which more currently exists, Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250 (1970), it has continued to find the original purposes of
the Act to be viable. Id. at 253.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has added its interpretation of the original function of including
a union liability provision in the Norris-LaGuardia Act:
Imposing liability on the union for the unauthorized lawlessness of its more improvident mem-
bers would penalize the union lawfully engaged in using the legitimate economic weapons
thought necessary for the proper resolution of labor-management conflicts. Therefore, Congress
enacted section 106, requiring clear proof of union participation in, authorization, or ratification
of unlawful conduct before liability could attach.
Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708, 728 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 39 (1957).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976); WASH. REv. CODE § 49.32.011 (1979).
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.32.110 (3) (1979). See also 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976). Indeed, a
variety of circumstances have been considered to be labor disputes in Washington. These have in-
cluded cases in which only one employee belonged to a union, Ostroff v. Laundry & Dye Works
Drivers' Local 566, 39 Wn. 2d 693, 237 P.2d 784 (1951), and in which a company violated a con-
tract with a union that restricted the sale of company bakery goods, Marvel Baking Co. v. Teamsters
Union Local 524, 5 Wn. 2d 346, 105 P.2d 46 (1940). See also Swenson v. Seattle Cent. Labor
Council, 27 Wn. 2d 193, 177 P.2d 873 (1947), where the court noted that a jurisdictional dispute
between two rival unions could be a "labor dispute," but was not one in the case at bar because one
union had been certified as the exclusive agent of the workers by the National Labor Relations Board.
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chanan involved physical harm. 68 This is solely a factual distinction, one
that has been given no further support in any cases or statutes addressing a
union's vicarious liability. Justice Rosellini assumed, without citing any
authority, that the United States Supreme Court would decide a future tort
case involving physical harm differently than it decided Gibbs, a tort case
involving an economic harm. 69 In fact, an indication to the contrary exists
in United Brotherhood where the Court stated that "[t]he limitations of
[section 6] are upon all courts of the United States in all matters growing
out of labor disputes, covered by the Act, which may come before
them. "70 This willingness of the United States Supreme Court to broadly
apply the union-liability standard is entirely consistent with the congres-
sional decision to include among labor disputes "any, controversy con-
cerning terms or conditions of employment." 71
The majority's other arguments against applying the limited liability
provision to tort cases are also unconvincing. The majority thought that
the title of the Labor Disputes Act limited its application to restraining
orders, injunctions, and contempt matters. Justice Horowitz convincingly
rebutted this limitation, explaining that, under Washington law, the title
of an act should not be considered as controlling the scope and intent of a
statute. 72 Nor does the legislature's silence following Titus necessarily
preclude applying RCW § 49.32.070 to tort actions. The United States
Supreme Court has cautioned that congressional silence alone does not
indicate the adoption of a controlling rule of law. 73 Also, Justice
Horowitz distinguished the two cases cited by the court to support its use
68. 94 Wn. 2d at 513-14,617 P.2d at 1006-07.
69. Id. The United States Supreme Court may yet supply a clear response to Justice Rosellini's
speculation. The Court currently is considering a petition for certiorari in a case which presents ques-
tions of union liability under pendent state tort claims. Kerry Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America. 637 F.2d 957 (3d Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3972 (U.S. June 30.
1981) (No. 80-1891).
70. 330 U.S. at 401 (emphasis added). Justice Frankfurter was concerned that such a broad ap-
plication of § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act too easily would allow unions to avoid responsibility for
wrongful conduct of members. Id. at 415 (dissenting opinion): see note 35 supra. It is true that.
under the federal liability provision, there is a greater likelihood that a union may publicly discourage
member misconduct, while privately remaining a party to it. This weakness in the federal approach.
however, must be weighed against the protection which it provides the union making a good faith
effort to control its members during a labor dispute. Also, the potential for a union to be brought
before the National Labor Relations Board on unfair labor practice charges is an incentive for it to
eschew wrongful behavior in the course of organizational activities. See, e.g., ILWU Local 6 v.
Sunset Line & Twine Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 1487 (1948). Admittedly, this latter incentive raises the
anomalous possibility that a union could be found responsible for unfair labor practices by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board while remaining protected from in-court damage liability for the same
conduct.
7 1. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
72. 94 Wn. 2d at 518, 617 P.2d at 1009 (dissenting opinion).
73. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970).
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of seventeen years of legislative inactivity, on the ground that they in-
volved statutes which were enacted after judicial interpretation of earlier
related laws. 74
C. Civil Cases In General Under RCW § 49.32.070
The Buchanan decision is likely to be applied to a number of civil ac-
tions against unions besides those involving tort liability. In his concur-
rence, Justice Rosellini found that all civil actions for damages fall out-
side of the Washington Act. 75 He was convinced that the United
Brotherhood holding was relevant only to criminal prosecutions because
the legislative history cited showed that proponents of section 6 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act were concerned mostly with reducing the number
of criminal conspiracy cases brought against unions. 76
Justice Horowitz, in dissent, strongly argued that this view is an un-
necessarily narrow interpretation of United Brotherhood and the Senate
Judiciary testimony referred to therein. He pointed out that the Supreme
Court in Gibbs relied upon its earlier United Brotherhood examination of
the legislative history of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to enlarge the applica-
tion of the federal liability provision. Justice Horowitz specifically
noted 77 the Gibbs Court's use of language from United Brotherhood con-
cerning the thrust of section 6 of the Act:
"[I]ts purpose and effect was to relieve organizations .. .and members
of those organizations from liability for damages or imputation of guilt for
lawless acts done in labor disputes by some individual officers or members
of the organization, without clear proof that the organization or member
charged with responsibility for the offense actually participated, gave prior
74. 94 Wn. 2d at 517-18, 617 P.2d at 1009 (dissenting opinion).
75. Id. at 513-14, 617 P.2d at 1006-07. Justice Rosellini quoted from United Brotherhood:
"Thus § 6 limited responsibility for acts of a co-conspirator-a matter of moment to the
advocates of the bill. Before the enactment of § 6, when a conspiracy between labor unions and
their members, prohibited under the Sherman Act, was established a widely publicized case had
held both the unions and their members liable for all overt acts of their co-conspirators. This
liability resulted whether the members or the unions approved of the acts or not or whether or not
the acts were offenses under the criminal law. While of course participants in a conspiracy that is
covered by § 6 are not immunized from responsibility for authorized acts in furtherance of such a
conspiracy, they now are protected against liability for unauthorized illegal acts of other partici-
pants in the conspiracy."
Id. at 512-13, 617 P.2d at 1006 (quoting United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330
U.S. 395, 404 (1947)).
76. 94 Wn. 2d at 513, 617 P.2d at 1006.
77. Id. 515, 617 P.2d at 1008 (dissenting opinion).
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authorization, or ratified such acts after actual knowledge of their perpetra-
tion. " 78
Although dictum, this passage demonstrates the Court's willingness to
apply section 6 to both criminal matters (imputation of guilt) and civil
matters (liability for damages). Given this broad statement and congres-
sional concern with overburdening union leaders with responsibility for
the acts of uncontrolled members, Justice Horowitz thought that RCW §
49.32.070 need not be limited to criminal prosecutions. He further as-
serted that, as a matter of statutory construction, the Washington Supreme
Court was obliged to interpret its state law in accordance with the con-
struction already given to the federal legislation from which it was bor-
rowed.79
Finally, neither the majority nor the concurring opinions in Buchanan
directly rebutted the Gibbs argument for civil application of section 6
that, under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), a union's lia-
bility for members' violations of the LMRA is determined under agency
standards, while offenses outside of the LMRA are to continue being de-
cided under the Norris-LaGuardia Act.8 0 In finding the Act to be appro-
priate to all non-LMRA claims, the Court in Gibbs interpreted Congress's
intent as desiring the maximum scope for section 6 of the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act. Thus, it is difficult to understand why conduct which was evalu-
ated by the Supreme Court as belonging within the federal liability stan-
dard should not similarly fall within the identical Washington liability
provision.
V. PROPOSED UNION LIABILITY TEST
In addition to injunctions, restraining orders, and contempt matters,
RCW § 49.32.070 should be applied to all civil actions for damages
which arise out of labor disputes. The Norris-LaGuardia and Labor Dis-
putes Acts accommodate many competing interests in the workplace with
minimum judicial interference. A union which is conducting legitimate
organizing and bargaining activities should not be subjected to potential
78. 383 U.S. at 736 (emphasis added) (quoting United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United
States, 330 U.S. 395, 403 (1947)). Justice Rosellini, in concurrence, apparently ignored this
language, stating that the court in Titus "was not unjustified in concluding ... that the United States
Supreme Court had found the thrust of the federal provision to be aimed at criminal prosecutions.
rather than at damage suits by persons who have suffered physical injuries at the hands of overzealous
picketers." 94 Wn. 2d at 513, 617 P.2d at 1006.
79. Id. at 516, 617 P.2d at 1008 (dissenting opinion).
80. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
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liability for isolated acts of wrongful conduct which it is powerless to
foresee or prevent, and which may unduly chill its lawful conduct.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently demonstrated the manner
in which a union's vicarious liability should be determined. In Scott v.
Moore,81 several unions were charged with responsibility for acts of mob
violence. In assessing their liability for members' assaults, the court ex-
amined the circumstances of the illegitimate behavior. In this case, the
court found that the members' unlawful activity did not occur in conjunc-
tion with an ongoing labor dispute, as defined in section 13(c) of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. So finding, the court then denied the defendant
unions the protection of the federal act. 82
This approach is commendable in applying the section 6 test to all
cases involving labor disputes. In future Washington tort actions, a judg-
ment of union liability should start with an assessment of whether the
wrongful conduct was directly related to a labor dispute as defined in
RCW § 49.32.110.83 Under the facts of Buchanan, for example, a court
would find that the assault occurred in conjunction with legitimate union
activity (a strike), thus falling within the statute. It then would decide
whether there was sufficient proof that the Teamsters actually had partici-
pated in, authorized, or ratified the tortious acts. If, on the other hand, no
sanctioned union activity was in progress at the time of the assault, the
Teamsters' responsibility then would be judged under common-law rules
of agency.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite legislative efforts to regulate union and management conduct,
isolated acts of violence are likely to remain an unfortunate element of
American labor relations for many years to come. As a result of the Bu-
chanan decision, a union's vicarious liability for members' assaults will
continue to be gauged by common-law rules of agency in Washington
state courts. Under federal law, the same liability will be subjected to the
stricter test set forth in the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
81. 640 F.2d 708 (5th Cir. 1981). This case involved an action brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) (1976) (a civil rights statute) by a construction company and two of its employees against a
trades council, its unions, and individual members. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants planned and
executed violence on a construction site.
82. 640 F.2d at 728-29. See generally text accompanying notes 66 & 67 supra (discussion of §
13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976)).
83. See generally notes 66 & 67 and accompanying text supra (discussion ofRCW § 49.32.110).
110).
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This disparity is unnecessary in view of the guidance provided by the
United States Supreme Court in United Brotherhood and Gibbs. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently has given an excellent illustration of
how the problem of determining a union's liability may be handled in
future tort cases. Given the policies behind the Labor Disputes Act, broad
application of RCW § 49.32.070 to all cases arising from labor disputes,
including those involving civil liability for torts, is appropriate.
Paul M. Feinsod
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